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Introduction
Previous research confirms the importance of socioeconomic status on learning and the limited role of physical investments (see, for example, World Bank 2005) . It is also expected that school climate, expectations, participation, autonomy, accountability and the use of assessments will have a significant impact on learning outcomes. It is also expected that an education system that is based on constant assessment and participation in international benchmarking exercises will improve its effectiveness. In most of the countries that performed In this paper we take advantage of the fact that Mexican data are representative at the state level to include more variables at the state level. This is done in an effort to measure the importance of state accountability systems, decentralization and union power on student learning outcomes. The analysis reaffirms the importance of school climate, but also supports the contention that further decentralization, school autonomy and assessment are important for improving learning outcomes in Mexico. It also points to the fact that the states are able to align their policies to ensure that what works at the local level materializes.
Review
Researchers have begun to use international assessments to analyze the determinants of learning. Hanushek and Luque (2003) indicate that attention to the quality of human capital in different countries naturally leads to concerns about how school policies relate to student performance. Using the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the results of their analyses of the educational production functions within a range of developed and developing countries show general problems with efficiency of resource usage similar to those found previously in the United States. These effects did not appear to be dictated by variations related to income level of the country or level of resources in the schools, and the conventional view that school resources are relatively more important in poor countries also failed to be supported.
At the country level some research using international assessments has appeared. Fertig (2003) used OLS and quantile regressions to analyze the determinants of German students' achievement using PISA 2000. Among the negative suggested factors were: schools without regular tests; too much regulation of schools; poor school conditions; not enough access to modern information technology for the students; non-native students; and high student-teacher ratio and shortage of teachers. Fertig and Schmidt (2002) provided, based on the individual-level data of the PISA 2000 study, a detailed econometric analysis of the way that reading test scores are associated with individual and family background information and with characteristics of the school and class of the 15 year old respondents to the survey. Based on quantile regressions, they interpreted the national performance scores, conditional on these observable characteristics, as the reflection of different education systems. Their findings suggest that United States students, particularly those in the lower quantiles, are served relatively unsatisfactorily by their system of education. Wolter and Vellacott (2002) analyzed the sibling size and birth-order effect on educational achievement in Switzerland on the basis of PISA data. They show that, besides the usual factors like education, wealth or the occupational status of parents, family configurations can play an important role in explaining differences between students.
Countries around the world are moving toward increased accountability of schools for student performance. The United Kingdom has an elaborate system of league tables giving parents information about the performance of schools in terms of test scores and other indicators.
The United States has legislated that all states develop an accountability system. Evidence on the impacts of these systems is growing. United States evidence indicates that strong accountability systems lead to better student performance (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Hanushek and Raymond 2005; Jacob 2005 ). Less evidence is available about accountability systems in developing countries. This could be due to weak accountability in these countries, along with a general lack of systematic measurement and reporting of student achievement.
In an important paper, Woessmann (2003) , using TIMSS, suggests that international differences in educational institutions explain the large international differences in student performance in cognitive achievement tests. An econometric student-level estimation based on data for more than 260,000 students from 39 countries reveals that positive effects on student performance stem from centralized examinations and control mechanisms, school autonomy in personnel and process decisions, competition from private educational institutions, scrutiny of achievement, and teacher influence on teaching methods. A large influence of teachers' unions on curriculum scope has negative effects on student performance. The findings imply that international differences in student performance are not caused by differences in schooling resources but are mainly due to differences in educational institutions. Taking all countries into consideration, he finds that the following factors positively impact science and mathematics learning: central examinations; centralized control of curriculum and budget matters; school autonomy in process and personnel; teacher incentives; limited influence of unions; scrutiny of student performance; parental interest; intermediate level of administration; and competition from the private sector. Fuchs and Woessmann (2006) obtain similar results using PISA 2000.
In fact, they find that 25 percent of the variation in scores is attributable to institutional variation.
Student performance is higher with external exams and budget formulation, but also with school autonomy in textbook choice, hiring teachers and within-school budget allocations. School autonomy is more beneficial in systems with external exit exams.
It is argued that teachers' unions may have a negative impact on learning outcomes (Hoxby 1996; Woessmann 2003 role in improving quality, it has so far given priority to raising members' salaries and expanding teaching staff. Recently the teachers' union has become more active in political issues, this time free of any political party affiliation. Some argue that the teachers' unions are a barrier to reform and improvement of the education system in Mexico (Ornelas 2004).
Overall union density has gone down in Mexico since 1984, from 30 to 21 percent, and this includes teachers (Fairris and Levine 2004) . There was a decline in the proportion of education sector workers (not just teachers, but also administrators, secretariat staff, etc.) that are unionized, from 73 percent in 1984 to 64 percent in 2000; still, teachers remain the most unionized segment of the labor force. In fact, all public school teachers belong to a union; it is mandatory. This is a higher proportion than Korea (5 percent), Singapore (22 percent), Great Britain (60 percent), Spain (63 percent), the United States (68 percent), the Netherlands (80 percent), Canada (81 percent) and Denmark (95 percent) (Kasten and Fossedal n.d.).
Another measure for union power is the level of conflict that exists between the state and the teachers' union. Unfortunately, in Mexico there is no official central registry of number of days that schools are closed due to strike activity. In fact, days away from school during strikes are not counted as teacher absenteeism. Conflict could be said to be the result of a lack of political alignment due to lack of trust and coordination problems that make negotiations difficult. Conflict between the state and the teachers' union was used by Murillo and others 
Methodology
We analyze the determinants of school achievement in Mexico using ordinary and generalized least squares. Factors affecting achievement are analyzed and compared. In this regard ordinary least squares (OLS) methods are used to analyze the determinants of learning.
The following linear regression model is estimated:
where Y is the test score and X 1 is a vector of student variables that include household characteristics such as socioeconomic indicators, and X 2 is a vector of school indicators such as school resources, school and institutional features. It is expected that the scores among students in the same schools will be correlated. The reason is that students enrolled in the same school are usually more similar to one another in behavior and characteristics than students enrolled in different schools. In other words, one would expect that student performance for given school factors would increase in order for those school variables to increase or improve, but one might also expect the variation on average school performance to increase as school factors increase or improve. However, because of the non-spherical error term ( ), the OLS estimation is not thought to be highly dependable. The OLS estimate does not account for dependency due to clustering effects. Other OLS estimates take into account the sampling procedure, but the correlation between other school characteristics implicit in the survey (location, type, level and program) would not be corrected. In order to accommodate for schools fixed effects we use the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation methodology. To
accommodate the school factors and cover for the between schools and within schools dimensions we estimate a combined model:
where X is the predictors' matrix that also includes the school and institutional variables -which are fixed for each student at the same school; S is the predictors matrix that includes student variables only; μ is a random element associated with school disturbances (as a second level random variable), which we assume to have covariance matrix T. We use the GLS estimate for 
Data
The student population in PISA is 15 year-olds, who are thus assessed as they approach the end of their compulsory schooling. For more information about the design, development and implementation of PISA, see http://www.pisa.oecd.org. Mexico was the only country that expanded the sample to include state representatives with a random sample of 29,983 students chosen from 1124 schools that participated in the assessment from all states (except Michoacan) and the Federal District. The survey was carried out in two stages; the explicit stratification was based on states and size of the schools, the implicit stratification was based on school type, urban/rural, school level and school program. Because the survey comprises three different questionnaires (cognitive skills, student and school questionnaires), there are variables with missing information for some students. We excluded all student observations from the analysis that have a missing value of at least one variable. The learning domains of reading, mathematical and scientific literacy, together with some other areas such as students' familiarity with computers, learning strategies, and students' attitudes towards their schools, have been chosen to be the foci of PISA. PISA's assessment materials focus on young people's ability to apply their knowledge and skills to reallife problems and situations, rather than on how much curriculum-based knowledge they possess.
The emphasis is on whether students, faced with problem situations that might occur in real life, are able to analyze, reason and communicate their ideas, arguments or conclusions effectively.
The term literacy is attached to each domain to reflect the focus on these broader skills. In the way that the term is used, it means much more than the traditional meaning of being able to read and write. The variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 1 .
A number of institutional variables were included in the analysis, taking advantage of the fact that Mexican data from PISA 2003 are fully representative at the state level. These new variables, therefore, are measured at the state level (Table 2 ; see also Annex Table 1 ). the result of a lack of political alignment due to lack of trust and coordination problems that make negotiations difficult.
Results
The full regression results are presented in Annex Tables 2 and 3 . In Annex Table 2 we enter each of the institutional state-level variables one at a time. First, it is shown that further decentralization within the state has a positive, but insignificant effect. Accountability systemsstudent testing, school rankings, school report cards -are shown to have a strong, positive and significant impact on learning outcomes. That is, states that do not rely only on important yet sample survey national student assessments have higher scores on PISA, controlling for everything else (second stage accountability system). Further, authorities that use the results of their state-wide assessment systems to inform the public, disseminate the results to the school, received feedback from users have a significant impact on learning outcomes. While student evaluations at the state level and evaluations systems that disseminate the results back to the school have positive and significant impacts, the greatest impact comes from more complete systems that non only use the results to inform policy and disseminate results, but also use the results to design specific interventions (fifth, or complete accountability stage), have a very large impact on learning outcomes. This makes it a particularly useful investment given its large contribution to learning outcomes as well as the fact that it is a very cheap investment (see below).
In this study, we have information on the power of unions ranging from low in terms of influencing the allocation of teacher positions, to medium, and high. Indeed, in Mexico union influence is associated with lower test scores. In our regression analysis we enter two union power variables; both are relative to low union power. A high influence is not significant.
However, medium power is significant and has a relatively large negative effect.
Another measure for union power is the level of conflict that exists between the state authorities and the teachers union in that state. The conflict variable takes values of: (1) lowdisagreements exist but they are not serious; (2) medium-disagreements are frequent but not profound; and (3) high--almost every year there are profound disagreements manifested in marches and suspension of school activities. Relative to high levels of conflict, only having a low level of conflict is significantly and positively associated with learning outcomes.
Full Model
However, when we include all factors together (Table 3) , it turns out that only two of the new institutional variables are significant for math: (1) using the state evaluation system to feedback to schools and design interventions and (2) conflict between the union and state. The full evaluation-feedback-design (fifth stage) system has the largest impact. None of the other variables are significant. This is a strong correlation suggesting that states can take significant actions to improve their school systems by developing and using an accountability system. Thus, institutions matter, but the most significant institutional issues are relatively low cost and under the direct control of state authorities. This is not to say that unions are unimportant, but relative union power is not a barrier to reform when states have the willingness to develop state evaluation systems and engage in further decentralization of pedagogical matters. In some states, interesting experiments are taking place to improve quality and efficiency, reflecting successful negotiations with the local sections of the teachers' union (OECD 2005) . The more successful states in terms of academic achievement, especially PISA scores, are making improvements in the selection of teachers, in collaboration with the teachers' unions in the state. For other subjects the results largely reconfirm the findings presented in the case of math.
The results for reading are almost identical to those for math. In the case of science accountability systems do not seem to be important and in one case having state testing has a negative correlation. For science outcomes only better relations with the teachers' union appears to be a significant determinant of outcomes. But when we analyze all subjects together the model seems to work. Having a complete accountability system has a strong correlation with overall test scores. Less conflict between the state and teachers' union improves overall test scores. Curiously though when we consider all three subjects together union influence on teacher positions, which was never a significant variable for any one subject alone, becomes significant. There is a negative correlation between a medium union influence and overall test scores. A high union influence is not significant.
In addition to the previous analysis, we have used quantile regression analysis to estimate the differential contribution of the institutional variables along the distribution of student achievement (Table 4) . Similar to the results from the full model, state authorities that use the results of their state-wide assessment systems to build a strong accountability system -inform the public, disseminate the results to the schools, and get feedback from users -have a more significant impact on learning outcomes of low performing students than for high performing students. For the students in the bottom of the distribution of achievement, institutional factors have a greater impact on their learning. Also, a low level of conflict between state authorities and the teachers' union has a significant and positive effect; medium union influence on teacher positions has a negative effect. The effects of these two union-related variables imply that low achieving students are vulnerable to union power. These results also suggest the need for more transparent and accountable educational institutions in order to address the needs of disadvantaged students, as well as a better relationship between state authorities and the teachers' union.
In order to attempt to address the causality issue, given the non-experimental nature of our data, we are using a propensity score matching algorithm that identifies comparable students with similar backgrounds, but that differs in terms of exposure to state accountability systems.
We are using the scores to match students of three similar states, Colima, Guanajuato and Tlaxcala. One state has a full accountability system (Colima), another one is at the mid-range of such a system (Guanajuato), and one lacks a state evaluation system (Tlaxcala). We have analyzed differences in estimated test scores based on exposure to different institutional factors at the state level. Annex Table 4 shows that the full accountability model -tests, publication, feedback and use for policy and strategy -produces significant differences and positive results.
Comparing Colima with Tlaxcala, the results show that the latter, a state with a poor performance that does not have a full evaluation system, could reach the average level of performance among Mexican states if it introduces full accountability. And the comparison between Colima and Guanajuato shows that once Guanajuato implements a full accountability system, it will be one of the top performing states. Tlaxcala could improve by 0.35 standard deviations and Guanajuato by 0.22 standard deviations if they introduce full accountability. It is not enough to have low levels of conflict with unions, although it helps. More importantly, paying teachers more will not necessarily reduce conflicts, and there is no evidence that it will lead to better learning outcomes (Figure 1 ). States with low levels of conflict and high teacher wages do very well. Even better are states that have complete and comprehensive accountability systems. The accountability system for Colima (World Bank 2005), the best performing Mexican state, is characterized by all three factors. 
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Towards cost-effectiveness
The national sample-based student assessment run by the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE) is estimated to cost only $US 6 dollars per student (Table 5) .
This compares to other major programs such school-based management which have been evaluated to perform well (Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina 2006; Skoufias and Shapiro 2006) . It also appears to be a much better investment than other, more expensive, interventions, such as high salaries for teachers or more computers. Many of the more expensive interventions are also untried or untested. To further assess the relative impact of accountability systems at the state level, we use the parameters produced in Table 3 , and forecast PISA scores in math, controlling for everything else, and varying both (a) the level of accountability and (b) the level of conflict between the state government and the teachers' union ( Figure 3 ). Clearly less conflict between union and government will lead to improved scores. The orders of magnitude are roughly in line with increasing levels of accountability up to the fourth stage. The increase in scores is much higher when states have full accountability systems, meaning that they implement their own assessments, use the results for policymaking, provide feedback to the schools, and use all that information to create strategies and programs. 
Level of Government-union conflict
Conclusion
The analysis of the new institutional variables suggests that, in general, more accountability (and assessment) is needed to improve learning outcomes. The analysis confirms the importance of continued use of assessments, not only at the national level for benchmarking and policy guidance, but also at the state level through universal state systems that provide constant feedback to beneficiaries and are used by the authorities to design interventions. S.E f.
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